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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CRIMINAL LAw-FORMER JEOPARDY-WHETHEtR WITHDRAWAL OF THE
SUBMISSION AND FURTHER INTERROGATION OF A JUROR AS TO
CATIONS CONSTITUTES A. BAR TO SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION

His

QUALIFIWHEN THE

SAME JUROR. Is AGAIN IMPANELED AND SWORN-In the recent case of
Maddox v. State,' the Supreme Court of Indiana was asked to adjudicate
upon the validity of a plea of former jeopardy filed by the defendant after
a juror, who had been re-interrogated as to his competency following a
withdrawal of the submission of the cause to the jury, was re-impaneled
'-Ind.-,

102 N. E.

(2d) 225 (1951).

Draper, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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and the jury again sworn. It appeared therein that, after the' jury had
been impaneled and sworn and the prosecuting attorney had begun his
opening address, one of the jurors indicated to the court his reluctance to
continue by reason of his newly-discovered relationship to one of the
defendants. Upon inquiry, counsel for the defense stated he neither
waived nor committed himself at that time with regard to the juror's
revelation. However, when the prosecuting attorney, by court instruction,
proceeded with his opening statement, counsel for the defense objected
that the defendant could not have a fair and impartial trial. The court
then, upon the prosecuting attorney's motion and over the defense objection, allowed the withdrawal of the submission of the cause "for the sole
. purpose of determining the qualifications of the said juror to
serve. "2 The juror was then found to be satisfactory to the prosecuting
attorney, although no questions were asked of him by either party, and
the jury was again sworn. Defendant thereupon filed an affirmative plea
of double jeopardy, to which the prosecution filed a reply. The trial
proceeded, the jury returned a verdict of guilty, and judgment being
entered thereupon, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. That
court, one judge dissenting, reversed the judgment with instruction to
sustain the plea and discharge the defendant from further prosecution.
It held that jeopardy attached when the jury was impaneled and sworn,3
so that if, thereafter, the jury was discharged without the defendant's
consent and in the absence of legal necessity for so doing, the defendant
could not again be placed in jeopardy for the same offence. 4 That result
was said to be dictated by the fact that the submission had been withdrawn without the defendant's consent and without legal necessity, for the
juror in question was not further examined but was immediately re-accepted without other questioning.
The majority opinion proceeded upon the theory that it was too
late, after the jury had been accepted and sworn to try the cause, to
examine the jurors further as to their competency, or to peremptorily
challenge any of them, unless a motion to set aside the submission was
first interposed. 5 As a cause is to be submitted to a jury as a whole, it
would obviously be necessary to set the submission aside before re-exInd. - at -, 102 N. E. (2d) 225 at 227.
People v. Watson, 394 Ill. 177, 68 N. E. (2d) 265 (1946), cert. den. 329 U. S.
769, 67 S. Ct. 130, 91 L. Ed. 662 (1946); Armentrout v. State, 214 Ind. 273, 15
N. R. (2d) 363 (1938). In general, see 22 0. J. S., Criminal Law, § 241, p. 375.
4 The general rule, as stated in 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 258, p. 394, is that
. . . if the jury are discharged without accused's consent for a reason legally
insufficient and without an absolute necessity for it, the discharge Is equivalent
to an acquittal, and may be pleaded as a bar to a subsequent indictment." See
also People v. Simos, 345 Ill. 226, 178 N. E. 188 (1931).
5 Kurtz v. State, 145 Ind. 119, 42 N. E. 1102 (1896).
2-
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amining any juror as to his qualifications in order that the jury would be
in the same condition it was before being sworn to serve as a jury. The
defendant's original objection was, therefore, improper and his failure to
request a withdrawal of the submission might well have operated to waive
his objection.6 When it appeared, however, that there was no legal necessity for the discharge of the jury and the discharge was produced over his
specific objection, 7 the court reasoned that the defendant had been exposed
to jeopardy before the submission was withdrawn, hence was entitled to
the benefit of his plea.
In considering any case wherein a jury has been impaneled and sworn
and a juror is thereafter withdrawn and another substituted,8 two classes
of cases may be immediately eliminated; those where the incompetence of
the juror is such as to render the verdict a nullity,9 and those cases where,
by legislative fiat, the court is allowed to substitute a juror without reference to a withdrawal of the submission of the cause, 10 or where it has
been provided that challenges, both for cause and peremptory, may be
taken after the jury has been impaneled and sworn."
An investigation of the instant problem discloses that the only extensive treatment thereof has been made by the Supreme Court of Indiana.
6 This would undoubtedly seem to be the rule in Indiana, for failure to use due
diligence in urging objections to the competency of a juror, as well as failure of
the complaining party to avail himself of such objections at the proper time, after
they have come to his knowledge, would create an implied waiver of the error:
Adams v. State, 99 Ind. 244 (1884); Maden v. Emmons, 83 Ind. 331 (1882);
Kingen v. State, 46 Ind. 132 (1874). But see Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S. E.
(2d) 518 (1949), and Guykowski v. People, 2 Ill. 476 (1838).
The better rule
would seem to be that a failure to use due diligence in ascertaining a juror's
incompetency, while interrogating him on his voir dire, would constitute a
waiver or estoppel as to such incompetency, except where the incompetency of
the juror would be such as to render the verdict reversible on review: Stone v.
People, 3 Ill. 326 (1840). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 78, § 2, specifies the
qualifications for jury service in Illinois.
7 In Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U. S. 199, 37 S. Ct. 107, 61 L. Ed. 244 (1916),
the Supreme Court of the United States, on an analogous situation, found no
violation of due process but only an irregularity brought about by an overzealous regard for the defendant's constitutional rights.

8 In jurisdictions providing for the use of alternate jurors, the problem is not
apt to arise: People v. Badenthal, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 404, 48 P. (2d) 82 (1935) ;
State v. Henderson, 182 Ore. 147, 184 P. (2d) 393 (1947), rehearing denied 182
Ore. 147, 186 P. (2d) 519 (1947).
9 The effect of the procedure upon the constitution of the jury, as followed in
the trial court, is not determinative in these cases, since procedural error would
be considered subservient to the effort of the trial judge to prevent a void verdict
from being rendered, it being impossible for either party to waive the juror's incompetency: Stone v. People, 3 Ill. 326 (1840); People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277,
27 N. E. 539 (1886) ; Manning v. State, 155 Tenn. 266, 292 S. W. 451 (1927).
10 State v. Hasledahl, 2 N. D. 521, 52 N. W. 315 (1892); State v. Davis, 31
W. Va. 390, 7 S. E. 24 (1888).
11 Nevada v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 101 (1881).
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That court, in the cases of Kurtz v. State12 and Gillespie v. State,13 had
occasion to lay the foundation for the decision in the instant case. The
first of these cases established the rule that it would first be necessary
to set aside the submission before further questioning a juror as to his
competency. The second merely applied the reasoning so expounded,
ruling that the discharge of a juror, upon the peremptory challenge of the
prosecuting attorney following a withdrawal of the submission, was such
an implied admission that the juror was competent that there could have
been no legal necessity for his removal. 14 The Indiana doctrine, then,
appears to be that after the jury is impaneled and sworn, a juror whose
competency then becomes suspect cannot be interrogated on this subject
unless a motion to set aside the submission is first interposed and allowed.
If such a motion is granted, however, it is allowed at the peril of the
prosecution for, if no legal necessity such as would justify the removal of
the juror is thereafter shown, the withdrawal of the submission is the
equivalent of an acquittal. 15 This, at first blush, may seem to be logical
but the propriety of that view is extremely questionable, for the trial
judge is faced with what is, in effect, an almost insurmountable difficulty.
Cases from other jurisdictions are substantially in accord with the
reasoning of the Indiana court as to what constitutes legal necessity authorizing the withdrawal and substitution of a juror, but there the similarity of reasoning ceases. In Deberry v. State,'1 6 the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, in commenting upon the substitution of a juror, said that the
discharge of a juror 17 does not break up the entire panel, but that the
other jurors remain a part thereof and are not again subject to challenge
nor are they to be resworn. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in State
v. Duvall,'1 in sustaining the trial court's action in overruling the defendant's motion to reswear the original eleven jurors after a juror had
been substituted, said that ". . . the motion necessarily implied an acceptance of the eleven jurors, and we agree . . . that the reswearing of

said jurors would have been idle and useless ceremony."'

9

The Arkansas

12 145 Ind. 119, 42 N. E. 1102 (1896).

13 168 Ind. 298, 80 N. E. 829 (1907).
14 The reasoning evidently proceeded upon the theory that a peremptory chal-

lenge would not have been necessary had the prosecuting attorney been able to
show legal cause for removal.
15The reasoning, somewhat doubtfully, presupposes that withdrawal of the submission amounts to a discharge of the jury. No other reported case, however,
has expressly so held.
16 99 Tenn. 207, 42 S. W. 31 (1897).
17 A plea of double jeopardy has been held good in similar situations:

Tomas-

son v. State, 112 Tenn. 596, 79 S. W. 802 (1903); Ward v. State, 20 Tenn. (1
Humph.) 253 (1839). See also O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 333
(1872).
18 135 La. 710, 65 So. 904 (1914).
19 135 La. 710 at 728, 65 So. 904 at 911.
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case of Martin v. State20 seems to be in accord with the last mentioned21
cases for the prosecution was there allowed to challenge a juror for cause,
after the jury had been impaneled and sworn, and another juror was
then substituted.
One of two possible solutions to the problem may be drawn from these
cases: either the substitution of the juror was done without the withdrawal
from the jury of the submission of the cause, or the submission was withdrawn but it did not operate to effect a discharge of the jury as a whole.
If the former is correct, the problem of substitution is substantially minimized. The court will then merely judicially ascertain, 22 without interference with the constitution of the jury, whether or not legal necessity
for discharge of the juror exists and, if it is found to exist, the juror will
merely be removed and another substituted, only the substitute juror then
being sworn. 23 The latter alternative would seem to be more in accord
with sound legalistic reasoning, and represents the course which probably
ought to be adopted, for the cause was submitted to the jury as a whole,
hence should be withdrawn from it before further re-examination of the
juror. 24

The mere fact of the withdrawal of the submission of the cause

should not, however, be deemed to represent a discharge of the jury,
except in those cases where the withdrawal occurs in the absence of legal
necessity. Since the discharge of the jury is normally considered a breakdown of its body, impeaching the organized identity thereof, 25 it would
seem that the events which transpired in the instant case did not constitute
a discharge of the jury. In fact, the defendant was tried by the identical
jurors whom he had voluntarily accepted and who had been sworn to try
the case; the organized identity of that body was not impeached ;26 there
was not even a separation. At most, an irregularity occurred, 27 which was
20 163 Ark. 103, 259 S. W. 6 (1924).
21 This procedure, however, represents an anomalous situation since, in the
absence of a statute to the contrary, the character of juror can scarcely be said
to attach while the right to challenge remains. State v. Hasledahl, 2 N. D. 521,
52 N. W. 315 (1892); Nevada v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 101 (1881).
22 That the discharge of a juror and substitution of another may not be done
upon the ex parte order of the court without a judicial hearing at which defend-

ant and his counsel are present, see Upchurch v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. Rep. 624, 38
S. W. 206 (1896).
23 The converse would obviously be that, if the discharge of the juror was not
from legal necessity, a breakdown of the jury would have occurred, equivalent

to an acquittal.

Kurtz v. State, 145 Ind. 119, 42 N. E. 1102 (1896).
25 Lewis v. State, 121 Ala. 1, 25 So. 1017 (1899).
26 In
Lewis v. State, 121 Ala. 1, 25 So. 1017 (1899), after the jury was impaneled and sworn, the court told one juror to stand aside but afterwards ordered
him to resume his place in the box. Held: no double jeopardy, but at most an
unprejudicial irregularity.
27 Lovato v. New Mexico, 242 U. S. 199, 37 S. Ct. 107, 61 L. Ed. 244 (1916).
24
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brought about by an error which did not prejudice the defendant in the
slightest. It would seem, then, that the plea of double jeopardy should
have been rejected.
Keeping within the bounds of established legal reasoning, yet with a
view to solving a practical problem which could be common to any trial
court, and without desiring to violate the defendant's constitutional right
to be placed but once in jeopardy, 2 the solution would seem to be that if,
after the jury is impaneled and sworn, there arises some question as to the
competency or qualifications of a juror, a preliminary hearing should be
held by the court to determine if legal cause exists for the removal of the
juror. If such legal cause is found, the court should entertain a motion,
if such be made, or should, upon its own motion, withdraw the submission
of the cause from the jury, with a view to permitting a challenge of the
juror on his renewed voir dire examination. If, upon the granting of the
motion to withdraw the submission, a challenge is not forthcoming from
either party, the court should, in order to prevent a re-impaneling and
re-swearing of the same juror, discharge the juror and substitute another
in his stead on the court's own motion. 29 In that way, it would be possible
to obviate any claim that there was no legal necessity for setting the submission aside. That method would also prevent possible recourse to a plea
of double jeopardy for legal cause for the nullification of the first purported trial would then exist.
R. K. HOFFMAN
DIVORCE--ALIMONY,

ALLOWANCES AND

DISPOSITION

OF PROPERTY-

WHEHER OR NOT THE ANNULMENT OF A SECOND MARRIAGE OPERATES TO

REvIvE AN EARLIER OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY-Litigation in the case

entitled Sutton v. Leib' provided the federal judiciary with an opportunity
to determine several important legal questions bearing on the effect to be
given to a remarriage and the subsequent annulment thereof on a prior
decree directing the payment of alimony. Plaintiff and defendant therein
had been lawfully married in Illinois in 1925 but had been divorced in
Illinois, in 1939, under a decree which provided for the payment of alimony in monthly installments, to plaintiff by defendant, for "so long as
plaintiff shall remain unmarried."
Subsequent to the divorce, plaintiff

established a residence in New York but, in 1944, had married one Henzel
while in Nevada.

That marriage occurred on the same day that Henzel

See, for example, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 10.
50 C. J. S., Juries, § 249, pp. 1006-7.
1- U. S. -, 72 S. Ct. 398, 96 L. Ed. (adv.) 352 (1952), reversing 188 F. (2d)
766 (1951), which had affirmed 91 F. Supp. 937 (1950), but on other grounds.
Frankfurter, J., wrote a concurring opinion.
28
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had been awarded an uncontested divorce in the last-mentioned state.
Henzel and the plaintiff immediately returned to New York and the defendant, plaintiff's first husband, upon learning of the marriage, ceased
making payments under the alimony decree. Shortly after plaintiff and
Henzel had returned to New York, Henzel's first wife filed a suit against
him for separate maintenance and charged that the Nevada divorce he
had obtained was null and void. Plaintiff thereupon promptly left Henzel
and instituted her annulment action on the ground that, as Henzel's first
marriage had remained valid in New York, her marriage to him was void
ab initio. The New York court, in due time, treating the Nevada divorce
as invalid, granted an annulment of the Nevada marriage of plaintiff and
Henzel. Plaintiff then brought action in a federal district court located
in Illinois, relying on diversity of citizenship, to recover the allegedly
accrued payments of alimony for the period from the date when defendant
ceased making regular payments to a date in 1947 when plaintiff had
validly married still another person.
The trial court entered a summary judgment for defendant on the
basis of a purported settlement and release.2 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the result but upon the
ground that the validity of the Nevada remarriage turned on the validity,
in Nevada, of the antecedent Nevada divorce which Henzel had obtained
from his New York wife. It assumed that, in the absence of direct attack
thereon, the Nevada decree was valid and binding in the state where it
was rendered,3 hence required recognition of the subsequent marriage
under the established rule that a marriage is to be deemed valid everywhere if the requirements of the marriage law of the state where the contract of marriage takes place have been complied with. 4 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court reversed on the basis that the lower courts
had failed to accord the proper degree of full faith and credit to the New
York annulment decree. It remanded the case so as to give the lower federal court an opportunity to determine the state of the Illinois law as to the
effect to be given to an annulment of a purported second marriage upon
an earlier decree providing for the payment of alimony as long as the
alimony recipient remained unmarried. It is presumed that the case is,
therefore, still pending to await a determination of that issue.
The problem so presented should be of interest not only in Illinois
2 See 91 F. Supp. 937 (1950).
The trial court recognized the possibility of a
full faith and credit problem relating to the effect to be given to the Nevada
divorce and the New York annulment, but did not deem it necessary to decide the

question.

3 Note, In particular, 188 F. (2d) 766 at 768.
4

Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 121.
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but also in other states which have, by statute,5 incorporated the tenor of
the instant decree regarding cessation of the obligation to pay alimony
upon remarriage into all divorce decrees, at least by implication if not by
express language. 6 It would seem to be clear that, in any decree pronounced subsequent to the enactment of such a statute and where there
is no question of the validity of the remarriage, the alimony obligation
ceases with the remarriage. In fact, Illinois courts have held it to be
mandatory that alimony should cease, 7 even though the parties may have
contracted otherwise,8 for the local statute has been said to be no more
than a codification of prior cases on the subject.9 Assuming such to be the
case, it would appear that a solution to the problem of the effect to be
given to an annulment of a later marriage ought also to be found in prior
cases, if any such exist, on the theory that they, too, have been codified
into statutory form.
The precise question appears to have been presented to the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District in the case of Lehmann v. Lehmann.10 In that case, the parties had been divorced in 1915 under an
Illinois decree providing that, in the event that plaintiff should remarry,
payments of alimony for her support should cease. Three months later,
plaintiff contracted a marriage with one Quintard in New Jersey. She
cohabited with Quintard for a period of about fifteen months in New York
and in Maine and then returned to Illinois where she sued to annul her
marriage to Quintard on the ground that it had been contracted in violation of an Illinois statute which then forbade remarriage within one
year following a divorce." The marriage was duly annulled by the Illinois court. Lehmann, upon learning of the remarriage, had ceased making
alimony payments to plaintiff in the belief that her remarriage had brought
an end to his obligation. Following the annulment, plaintiff sued to force
Lehmann to pay her the regular alimony payments called for by the
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19, for example, directs that a party shall
not be entitled to alimony and maintenance after remarriage. The statute was

not enacted until after the first divorce decree in the Sutton case: Laws 1933,
p. 490. Comparable statutes may be found in Deering, Cal. Civ. Code 1949, § 139;
Colo. Stat. Ann., Ch. 56, § 8; Nev. Comp. Laws 1939, § 9463: New Jersey Stat.
Ann., Tit. 2:50-38, and Thompson, Cons. Laws N. Y., Civil Practice Act, § 1159.
6 Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940), cert. den. 311 U. S.
670, 61 S. Ct. 29, 85 L. Ed. 430 (1941).
7 Banck v. Banck, 322 I1. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944).
8 Miller v. Miller, 317 Iil. App. 447, 46 N. E. (2d) 102 (1943).
9 Banck v. Banck, 322 Ill. App. 369 at 376, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 at 581.
10 225 Il1. App. 513 (1922).
11 Laws 1905, p. 194, repealed by Laws 1923, p. 327, provided in substance that
in every case in which a divorce had been granted neither party should marry
again within one year from the time when the decree was granted, and that if
either of the parties did remarry within such one-year period, such marriage should
"be held absolutely void." See note to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 2.
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divorce decree. The trial court found that while the Quintard ceremony
may have been valid in New Jersey it was clearly void in Illinois, was
actually no marriage, that petitioner had not remarried within the meaning of the terms used in the divorce decree, and that she had not forfeited
her right to alimony payments. The Appellate Court, admitting that
plaintiff's marriage would not have been valid under Illinois law, treated
the marriage as valid in New Jersey,1 2 as well as valid in New York and
Maine where plaintiff had resided with Quintard, and was a remarriage as
contemplated by the words of the divorce decree. It noted that, if plaintiff were to be allowed to recover alimony for the period she had cohabited with Quintard, she could have continued to so cohabit with him
while being also entitled to receive the regular periodic alimony payments
under the decree. In that regard, it quoted from the Illinois case of
Stillman v. Stillman,13 where it had been said that it was "unreasonable
that she should have the equivalent of an obligation of support by way
of alimony from a former husband, and an obligation from a present
husband for an adequate support at the same time." According to that
court, it was "her privilege to abandon the provision the decree of the
court made for her support under the sanctions of the law, for another
provision for maintenance which she would obtain by a second marriage."
When she had done so, however, the law would "require her to abide by her
election. '14 The law of Illinois, at that time, seemed to be established on
the point that an annulment of a remarriage would not operate to revive
the earlier alimony obligation.
Some seven years later, the New York Court of Appeals, in the case
of Schleicher v. Schleicher,1 5 dealt with much the same type of problem.
The parties there had been married in 1908, separated in 1923, and had
been divorced under a Nevada proceeding in 1924. The separation agreement had provided that the husband would pay a stated sum to his wife
for her support and maintenance until she remarried. She did, in 1924,
marry one Hannum, but this later marriage was annulled in New York,
in 1927, by reason of Hannum's insanity. Here, also, the former husband
had stopped making the stipulated payments of support money, a form of
alimony, upon his former wife's remarriage. The plaintiff, following the
annulment, contended that her right to payment had been revived when
the second marriage was declared void ab initio. The court so held,
although it divided over the point of the extent of the former husband's
12 The provisions of the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951,
Vol. 1, Ch. 89, § 19, appeared to have been inapplicable.
13 99 Ill. 196 (1881).
14 99 Ill. 196 at 202.
15 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501 (1929). Kellogg, J., wrote a concurring opinion,
concurred in by O'Brien, J.
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obligation. Judge Cardozo, writing for the majority, indicated that the
particular marriage was voidable, not void, in its inception but that the
annulment, when decreed, put an end to the marriage from the beginning.
Nevertheless, the majority felt that while the plaintiff should be allowed
to recover support for the period after the marriage had been annulled,
nothing should be granted for the period during which she had been
supported by her second husband. Principal reliance was placed on two
English cases. 16 It was the opinion of the minority that since the marriage was void from the beginning, under the doctrine of relation back,
classed by the majority as an inapplicable legal fiction, the plaintiff should
be entitled to recover for the entire period during which her first husband had failed to pay.
Except for these two cases, there would appear to be nothing in the
American reports on the particular question, for the recent Louisiana
case of Keeney v. Keeney, 7 based on a similar fact question, turns on the
fact that, in that state, alimony is considered more in the nature of a
pension than a perpetuation of the husband's duty to support his former
wife, hence is to be deemed cut off even though the remarriage should be
later annulled. Some uncertainty may have been engendered in the law
of Illinois, however, by the later Illinois case of People ex rel. Byrnes v.
Retirement Board,' also decided by the Appellate Court for the First
District, as it seems to have adopted the New York rule. The case arose
when a fireman's widow applied to the retirement board to be reinstated
on the pension roll following the annulment of her second marriage. The
Appellate Court, approving views expressed in the Schleicher case, decided that the annulment put an end to the remarriage from the beginning,
rather than from the time of its dissolution, as would be the case in the
event of a divorce. Finding that the remarriage had been effaced as if it
had never been, the court ordered the widow restored to the pension roll
"on the footing of its nullity,"19 but declared that since this was a pension, it had no authority to direct the payment of the pension for the
period of time during which the widow had been living with, and had
been supported by, her second husband.
It is worthy of note that the court treated the Byrnes case as being
one of first impression, for it appears to have approved a contrary foreign
decision without knowledge of the fact that there might have been a prior
16 Matter of Wombell's Settlement, [19221 L. R. 2 Ch. 298, and In re Garnett,
(1905] L. J. 74 Ch. Div. 570.
17211 La. 585, 30 So. 549 (1947).
18 272 Ill. App. 59 (1933).
19 272 Ill. App. 59 at 67.
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Illinois case in point. 20 It might, however, be said that the Byrnes case,
approving the New York view, is not really controlling on the point here
under consideration as it deals with a pension question. If so, anything
there decided would be dicta for the purpose of the instant problem,
leaving the Lehmann case, never specifically overruled, to stand as the
current Illinois view as to alimony matters. Technical distinctions do
exist between these two Illinois cases for, in the first, the court ruled on
the effect to be given to an annulment of a remarriage in relation to the
obligation to pay alimony, a substitute for the husband's legally imposed
obligation to support his former wife, while in the second case it passed
upon the effect to be given a similar annulment as it related to the granting of a pension to the widow of a civil servant. When it is remembered
that such a pension is a "bounty of the government, which it has the
right to give, withhold, distribute, or recall at its discretion, "21 the basis
for distinction is made more apparent.
Even if no distinction existed, it could be said that the Byrnes case
should not be followed for it erroneously rests on a decision which itself
is based on error. Judge Cardozo, in the Schleicher case, had expressed
the opinion that his views were justified by cases in which bequests of
income were to be paid until remarriage. He referred to the English cases
of Matter of Wombell's Settlement2 2 and In

re Garnett.23

Again, an

examination of these two cases would reveal that they are not authority
for the position taken. They were, rather, cases in which it was decided
that if a father should make a settlement of a sum of money upon his son,
or upon his daughter's intended spouse, to be delivered upon the celebration of the marriage, such settlement could be recovered in the event the
marriage should subsequently be annulled. The obvious failure of consideration for such a settlement would justify that result, but the instant
problem involves no elements of contractual consideration nor the failure
thereof.
On the basis of applicable case law alone, then, it would appear that
the Illinois Appellate Court decision in the Lehmann case should control
the rights of the parties in the Sutton case. If a new, and authoritative,
Illinois decision on the point should be necessary, in preference to having
20 Examination of the brief filed by counsel for the retirement board reveals
that the case of Lehman v. Lehman, 225 Ill. App. 513 (1922), was not cited, nor
was the theory of that case explored. Counsel relied principally on the claim
that the right to be restored to the pension rolls had been taken away by statute
when the widow remarried and that there was nothing in the statute to authorize
a restoration to the pension rolls.
21 See Black, Law Diet., 4th Ed., citing Pecoy v. City of Chicago, 265 Ill. 78, 106
N. E. 435 (1914).
22 [19221 L. R. 2 Ch. 298.
23 [1905] L. J. 74 Ch. Div. 570.
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the state of the Illinois law determined by a federal court, a simple method
is available to that end.2 4 It would seem, however, that, as stated in the
Stillman case, the plaintiff had the "privilege to abandon the provision
the decree of the court made for her support under the sanctions of the
law for another provision for maintenance which she would obtain by a
second marriage. "25 Having exercised the privilege, she should be required to abide by her election.
The decision of the Supreme Court, however, appears to have opened
the door to the creation of still further ambiguities in law. It is well
known that "migratory" divorce has proved to be a plague to the courts.
There is now added a threatened plague stemming from the "migratory"
annulment. If jurisdiction to annul a marriage were limited to the state
where the marriage was celebrated, only the courts of one state would be
concerned with the problem and, until annulment had occurred there,
other courts would be free to act on the basis of the record. It must be
admitted that courts have, without giving too much thought to the matter,
directly or inferentially, recognized a jurisdiction in the court of domicile
to annul a marriage celebrated elsewhere, treating the question as being
identical with that involved in a divorce proceeding,2 6 but to be dealt with
27
according to the law of the forum rather than by the lex loci cantractus.
There has, however, been a respectable dissent on the ground that the
analogy is not sound.2"
Annulment, like divorce, is designed to operate on a status, hence is
a proceeding in rem and would require that the court should have jurisdiction over the res. It is conceivable that an aggrieved spouse could, by
change of domicile, move the status of marriage, an admittedly valid and
24 Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in the instant case, offered
the thought that the Court of Appeals should hold the case in abeyance until
the parties requested a declaratory judgment from the Illinois Supreme Court.
A second suggested method would be to dismiss the case on the basis that the
necessary jurisdictional amount is lacking. Even under the view most favorable
to the plaintiff, she would be entitled to back alimony only from September, 1947,
the date of the New York annulment, to November, 1947, the date of her marriage
to Sutton. The amount thereof would be inadequate in a diversity of citizenship case: Howard v. Jennings, 141 F. (2d) 193 (1944).
Suit could then be left
to state court action.
25 99 Ill. 196 at 202.
26 See annotation in 128 A. L. R. at 64-5, and Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 82 N. E.
850, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996 (1907); Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35, 44 Am. Rep. 81
(1882), writ of error dismissed 107 U. S. 319, 27 L. Ed. 499, 2 S. Ct. 312 (1883).
27 Anonymous v. Anonymous, - Del. -, 85 A. (2d) 706 (1952).
28 Goodrich, "Jurisdiction to Annul a Marriage," 32 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1919),
contains an excellent theoretical treatment of the question. See also Dodd,
"Annulment of Marriage," 23 Ill. L. Rev. 75 (1928).
Walker, J., in his dissent in
Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 35 (1882), at pp. 49-50, indicated that a foreign court
would lack the power "to construe and give authoritative judgment against the
validity of contracts made under our laws" and suggested that an Illinois court
would "not be bound by the decree of nullity."
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existing thing in law, into another state for the purpose of bringing that
status before a court sitting there in order to secure its destruction by
divorce. It is, likewise, theoretically possible to accomplish the same thing
with respect to a voidable marriage for purpose of annulment inasmuch as
it could be said that, until annulment has been granted, a "thing" exists,
even though in imperfect fashion. Where, however, the charge is made
that the purported marriage is void, and has been so from the beginning,
one might well ask what "thing" there is to be carried across state lines
into the adjoining jurisdiction to be there dealt with? Actually, the only
"thing" in existence, the only "thing" to be destroyed, is a purported
public record of a marriage and that is to be found at the place of celebration and there only. By analogy to a suit to nullify the effect of a
forged but recorded deed to land, the annulment proceeding, in the last
mentioned instances at least, should be deemed local rather than transitory
in character.

29

To compound the confusion, the United States Supreme Court has
now declared that when the domiciliary state, possessing no more than
control over the parties, has pronounced a decree of annulment relating to
an allegedly void marriage occurring in a sister state, which marriage
might well have been declared valid at the place of celebration had the
annulment proceeding been there instituted, other states must give full
faith and credit to the annulment decree. If bound to recognize the uncancelled public record of the one state, yet forced to apply the annulment
decree of the other, a third state would stand in much the same position
as the proverbial innocent bystander, to-wit: sure to get hurt but unable
to do much about it.
A. GELLER
RELEASE--CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATIN-WHETHER OR NOT RELEASE,
GIVEN TO ONE TORT FEASOR COVERING STATUTORY LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH, OPERATES TO RELEASE ANOTHER FROM CAUSE OF ACTION ARISING
FROM VIOLATION OF "DRAM SHOP" STATUTE-The Appellate Court for the

Fourth District, in the case of McClure v. Lence,' was faced with the

problem as to whether or not a release given to one for a cause of action
resting on the Wrongful Death Act

2

would operate to bar a subsequent

29 In O'Brien v. Eustice, 298 Ill. App. 510, 19 N. E. (2d) 137 (1939), it was
indicated that it would be necessary to add the proper public official as a party

defendant if the purpose of the annulment proceeding was to secure nullification
of the public record of the purported marriage. The implication of that holding
would be that, if such public official were the official of another state, it would
be necessary to begin suit at the place of his official residence, otherwise it
would be impossible to obtain jurisdiction over him.
1345 Ill. App. 158, 102 N. E. (2d) 546 (1951).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1 et seq.
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suit, for the same injury, against another based on the Illinois Liquor
Control Act.3 The case was one in which several minors, patrons of the
defendant's tavern, had allegedly there become intoxicated. After leaving
the tavern, the car in which they rode, driven by one of the minors, became
stalled on a railroad crossing, was struck by an approaching train, and
three of the passengers were killed. The legal representatives of the deceased automobile passengers gave full and binding releases to the railroad
in question and thereafter sued the tavern keeper for damages arising from
a violation of the liquor control law. 4 The defendant, among other things,
5
pleaded the releases given the railroad as a special defense, but that
defense, on motion, was stricken on the theory that the causes were distinct
and arose under different statutes. Judgment was given in favor of the
several plaintiffs after trial but, on appeal by defendant, the Appellate
Court reversed and remanded the cause with a direction to overrule the
motion to strike the special defense relating to the releases.
While the foundations for the proposition that a release given to one
joint tort feasor should operate to release the others are in some state of
confusion, 6 the doctrine is, nevertheless, a practically unanimous one in
the United States. 7 There is, however, much confusion over the problem
of who should be treated as joint tort feasors for this purpose and the
conflict is apparent in the Illinois cases on the subject. The earliest and
foundation case in this state would appear to be that of Chapin v. Chicago
& Eastern Illinois Railroad Company.8 Counsel for the plaintiff therein
had contended that a release given to one of the parties did not bar action
against the defendant as they were not joint tort feasors. The court,
holding for the defendant, stated: "Whether they were joint tort feasors
or not, we do not deem it important in the view we take of the case. It is
9
enough if they were both liable for the same injury." While the words
quoted were probably dicta, since the plaintiff's injuries had been caused
in a collision between two railroad trains and the two carriers would be
joint tort feasors under any construction given to the phrase "joint tort
feasors," at least one later Illinois case has followed the reasoning there
expressed where the several causes, although arising at different periods
3

Ibid., Ch. 43,

§ 94

et

seq.

Ibid., Ch. 43, § 135, provides for a civil remedy for damages caused by an intoxicated person.
5 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(4), lists a release as being one of the affirmative
defenses there mentioned.
6 See opinion of Rutledge, J., in McKenna v. Austin, 134 F. (2d) 659 (1943).
7 Welty v. Laurent, 285 Ill. App. 13, 1 N. E. (2d) 577 (1936). See also annotation
in 104 A. L. R. 847.
8 18 Ill. App. 47 (1885).
4

9 18 Il1. App. 47 at 50.
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of time, were related and rested on common law principles of negligence
so as to be within the classification of a "joint" tort.10 The doctrine has
also been applied by the Appellate Court for the Second District, in
Manthei v. Heimerdinger," to a case involving a release given to one for a
cause resting on common law negligence producing personal injury but
deemed to operate as a bar to a suit against a tavern keeper, based on a
violation of the liquor control law, for conduct leading up to the injury.
The court there cited the Chapin case in support of the idea that it is
relatively unimportant whether the parties are technically joint tort feasors
so long as they are liable for the same indivisible injury arising out of a
single accident.
Another line of Illinois cases, however, beginning with the decision in
Scharfenstein v. Forest City Knitting Company,'1 2 would indicate that it is
necessary, for the principle of release to operate, that the parties be, in
fact, "joint" tort feasors. The plaintiff there had released a railroad from
its liability to him predicated on the Federal Employer's Liability Act and
had thereafter sued a corporation which had negligently permitted its
agents to pile dirt on the railroad tracks. The case may be weakened
somewhat by the fact that the instrument was probably no more than a
covenant not to sue, but the court did say that, even if it could be construed to be a release, the plaintiff's cause of action, resting on a distinct
tort, would not be barred. That view has been followed in other cases,
including one in which a covenant not to sue for wrongful death has been
13
treated as inadequate to bar a suit based on the "Dram Shop" statute.
In those cases, the court has looked for, and found, a distinct basis for
liability as to each of the parties involved.
Faced with these conflicting decisions, the Appellate Court in the
instant case chose to follow the first of these views. As the Chapin case
has never been overruled, and as those cases which seem to be contrary do
not reject the theory thereof but ignore it, the result attained would seem
10 In Guth v. Vaughan, 231 I1. App. 143 (1923), for example, the plaintiff was
injured in an automobile accident but the injuries were aggravated by the mal-

practice of a physician. A release given to the automobile driver was held to bar
an action against the physician. The case of Aiken v. Insull, 122 F. (2d) 746 (1941),
certiorari denied 315 U. S. 806, 62 S. Ct. 638, 86 L. Ed. 1205 (1942), states that the
Illinois law is that tort feasors are released if "they were both liable for the same
injury." It cites Chapin v. C. & E. I. R. R. Co., 18 Ill. App. 47 (1885), as authority.
11332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N. E. (2d) 132 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEW 358.

12 253 Ill. App. 190 (1929).
13 Herberger v. Anderson Motor Service Co., 268 Ill. App. 403 (1932); Hyba v.
Horneman, Inc., 302 Il1. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d) 564 (1939). The last mentioned
case held that a covenant not to sue for a wrongful death did not bar a subsequent
suit by the administrator based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 94 et seq.
See also -Meyers v. Y. M. C. A. of Quincy, Illinois, 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d)
755 (1942).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

to be the sounder one. If it is the purpose of the law of torts to assure no
more than compensation to one who has been injured by the acts of others,
then one who has received full compensation from one of the several
wrongdoers, or who has entered into a contract from which it may be
presumed that he has received full compensation, should have no right to
further judicial action for the purpose of the law has been satisfied. The
amount of recovery should not, ordinarily, be made to depend on the
fortuitous circumstance that in one case the bases for the suit rest on
different statutes and in the other on different common law theories of
liability. The fact that a death has ensued should not, alone, be enough to
change the outcome which would have been attained had the victim survived and given a release of his common law cause of action for personal
injuries. 14 The same should be true as to a release given on a cause resting
on the "Dram Shop" statute for, although the statute creates a separate
and distinct right of action unknown to the common law, 15 the right of
recovery rests on the fact of injury and not merely on the sale of liquor.
If the legislature had intended that the statute should serve to provide
the basis for an additional recovery, even though full compensation has
already been received from another whose acts concurred in producing the
death or injury, it should have expressly so stated. In the absence of such
a statement, a court should not presume that the statute derogates against
the common law doctrine that a person should have but one recovery for a
single injury.
W. J. MOORE

14 Holton v. Daley, 106 Ill. 131 (1883); Crane v. Chicago & Western Indiana
R. R. Co., 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222 (1908). The reasoning of these cases appears
to have been overlooked in Hyba v. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 23 N. E. (2d)
564 (1939), where the two statutory claims grew out of the same wrongful act.
It is true, however, that the case involved only a covenant not to sue, hence there
could be no presumption of full satisfaction.
15 O'Connor v. Rathje, 368 Ill. 83, 12 N. E. (2d) 878 (1937).

